One country does not have to mean one centre of government.

Suppose a road has collapsed, a public school lacks teachers, a community wants a functioning primary healthcare centre, and electricity supply is unreliable.

Citizens ask: “What is the government doing?”

It sounds like a reasonable question. But it contains a difficulty. Which government?

Nigeria has a President and a Federal Government. It also has 36 governors and 36 state governments, each with a legislature and an executive. Below them are local government councils. And Abuja, the Federal Capital Territory, has a constitutional arrangement that does not make it an ordinary thirty-seventh state.

If a citizen does not know how responsibility is distributed, the phrase the government may conceal more than it explains.

To understand why authority is arranged this way, we must begin with two words that are often used as if they mean the same thing: federation and federal government.

1. Nigeria is a federation, not merely a government in Abuja

Section 2 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, as amended, describes Nigeria as one sovereign state and a federation consisting of states and a Federal Capital Territory. Section 3 names 36 states.

A federation is a constitutional political arrangement in which authority is distributed between a government acting for the whole and governments exercising power within constituent territories.

Nigeria, the federation, is the larger political and constitutional order. The Federal Government is one government within that order, although it exercises powers of nationwide significance.

This difference deserves careful attention.

When the Federal Government announces a policy, it is not necessarily exercising every power available anywhere in Nigeria. Some matters fall within state authority. Others involve federal and state powers in constitutionally defined ways. And some require the participation of local councils or specialised public bodies.

A governor is therefore not simply a branch manager appointed by the President. Nor does the President become the lawful superior of every state institution merely because the office is called federal.

The Constitution, rather than a casual ranking of politicians, determines their respective powers.

The federation is the shared political home; the Federal Government is not the owner of every room within it.

2. Why divide political power at all?

Imagine two extremes.

Under a strongly unitary arrangement, the central government may possess primary lawmaking authority and determine what powers subordinate territorial authorities exercise. Administration may be decentralised, but those powers need not be constitutionally protected in the same way.

At the opposite extreme, separate political communities might cooperate on selected matters while retaining much more of their independent authority, as in a confederal arrangement.

Federalism seeks a form of organised coexistence between these possibilities. A common government handles certain shared concerns, while constituent governments exercise authority over other concerns under a common constitutional framework.

Why might a country choose such an arrangement?

One reason is diversity. Different communities may wish to participate in a common political order without surrendering every important decision to a single centre.

Another is scale. A distant central authority may know less about the practical needs of particular towns and communities than institutions closer to them.

A third is accountability. Where responsibilities are genuinely divided and transparent, citizens may identify more clearly which authorities must answer for particular decisions.

Federalism can also create opportunities for experimentation. Different states may test approaches to public administration, commerce or service delivery within constitutional limits, and others may learn from their results.

None of these benefits is automatic. Decentralised institutions can be badly governed, just as central institutions can. A smaller political unit is not inherently more honest, efficient or inclusive.

The argument for federalism is not that local politicians are naturally better people. It is that some important decisions should not depend entirely on one political centre.

3. Why exactly 36 states?

Here history becomes indispensable.

At independence in 1960, Nigeria's federal structure was organised around three regions: Northern, Eastern and Western. The Mid-Western Region was created in 1963, bringing the number to four.

After military intervention, the country's territorial structure changed repeatedly. The regions were replaced by 12 states in 1967. The number grew to 19 in 1976, 21 in 1987, 30 in 1991 and 36 in 1996.

Those numbers were not discovered through a universal mathematical rule showing that 36 is the ideal number for Nigeria. They resulted from historical and political decisions.

Demands for new states had multiple motivations. Ethnic minorities sought protection against domination by larger regional groups. Communities wanted access to political representation, public investment and administrative headquarters. Military governments also used territorial reorganisation to pursue national and strategic objectives.

The result presents a paradox.

Many of the states that now exercise constitutional powers in Nigeria were created through decisions made by highly centralised military governments.

The states subsequently became part of the federal constitutional structure under civilian rule. But their origins remind us that the history of a federation is not always a straightforward history of equal communities freely negotiating its design.

There is a further question worth asking: did creating more states bring government closer to communities, or did it sometimes multiply political offices while increasing dependence on centrally distributed revenue?

The answer is unlikely to be identical across all states or periods. It requires historical and economic evidence, not a slogan.

4. A federation is more than a map divided into pieces

Suppose Nigeria had 72 states tomorrow. Would that make it twice as federal?

Not necessarily.

The number of constituent units tells us something about territorial organisation, but not enough about how power actually works.

A meaningful examination of federalism asks at least four questions.

Authority: What decisions may a state make without seeking permission from the Federal Government?

Resources: Does the state have sufficient lawful revenue and administrative capacity to carry out its responsibilities?

Accountability: Can residents scrutinise and replace state leaders, and are the state's own institutions capable of checking abuses?

Coordination: How are problems handled when their effects cross state boundaries?

A political system could have many states but concentrate crucial powers and resources at the centre. Another could have fewer units with substantial authority and capacity.

Consequently, the debate over the number of states must not replace the debate over the powers and capacities of states.

Federalism concerns the distribution of government, not merely the multiplication of governments.

5. Who can make laws about what?

Nigeria's Constitution provides an essential practical instrument: the allocation of legislative powers under section 4 and the Second Schedule.

The Exclusive Legislative List identifies subjects on which the National Assembly has legislative authority at the federal level, subject to the Constitution.

The Concurrent Legislative List addresses specified matters on which the National Assembly and State Houses of Assembly may legislate within the limits set out by the Constitution.

States also possess legislative authority over matters that are not placed on the Exclusive List, subject to other constitutional provisions. These are commonly described as residual matters.

This is not simply a neat division into three boxes. The exact wording of each constitutional provision matters. So do valid federal laws, state laws, judicial decisions and, in many cases, the division between lawmaking, regulation, funding and service delivery.

For example, the constitutional changes enacted in 2023 expanded state legislative possibilities in electricity and moved railways from the Exclusive List to the Concurrent List. Correctional services were also addressed through the Fifth Alteration Acts.

That means a civic explanation based on an older copy of the Constitution may give readers the wrong answer to a current question.

The first rule of constitutional reasoning is to use the law as it stands, not merely the version one remembers.

Even where a state possesses legislative authority, it does not follow that every project, regulatory licence or institution in that sector is automatically under that state's exclusive control. The applicable constitutional text and implementing laws must still be examined.

6. The difference between power and money

It is easy to say that a state is constitutionally empowered to perform a function. It is harder to establish that it has the financial capacity to perform it well.

Section 162 of the Constitution establishes a framework for the Federation Account and the distribution of qualifying public revenues among the federal, state and local levels, according to applicable constitutional and statutory arrangements.

The Federation Account should not be confused with a private purse belonging to the Federal Government. It is part of the constitutional fiscal system of the federation.

Yet access to distributed revenue is only part of the story. States also differ in their capacities to raise internally generated revenue, attract investment, manage expenditure, borrow lawfully and build productive local economies.

This creates two separate questions:

What functions does a state have the authority to perform?

What resources and capabilities does it have to perform them?

A federation may distribute constitutional responsibility without distributing sufficient practical capacity. Alternatively, leaders may have adequate resources but manage them poorly.

The remedy in the first case could involve revenue reform, institutional capacity or a different allocation of functions. The remedy in the second may centre on governance, transparency and accountability.

We should not assume that every failure proves either that federalism is defective or that a particular governor is dishonest. First identify the obligation, the available resources, the decisions taken and the evidence of performance.

7. What about local governments?

Our everyday lives are often shaped most directly by institutions below the state level.

Nigeria's Constitution recognises 768 local government areas within the 36 states and six area councils in the Federal Capital Territory: 774 local-level units in all.

Section 7 guarantees a system of democratically elected local government councils and gives states defined responsibilities concerning their establishment, structure, composition, finance and functions. The Fourth Schedule sets out functions associated with local government councils.

Local councils therefore cannot be understood simply as departments that a governor may run however the governor wishes.

This distinction became especially important in the Supreme Court's judgment of 11 July 2024 in Attorney General of the Federation v Attorney General of Abia State and Others, concerning elected local councils and financial autonomy. The Court rejected practices that undermined constitutionally required democratically elected councils and supported direct payment of allocations in the circumstances addressed by its judgment.

The judgment, however, does not by itself prove that every council subsequently received funds or operated independently in practice. Legal decisions and their implementation remain different things.

This gives citizens another tool of inquiry. When a local service fails, ask not only which level of government has a role, but also whether the council has lawful leadership, whether allocations reached it, which duties the law assigns to it and which other institutions share responsibility.

8. Is Abuja a thirty-seventh state?

No. The Federal Capital Territory is not listed as one of the 36 states.

Its constitutional position is distinct. Section 299 provides a special arrangement under which certain constitutional powers that would ordinarily relate to a state are exercised in relation to the FCT through federal institutions, as the Constitution specifies.

This is an example of why ordinary political language can mislead us. Abuja may have local institutions and residents with public-service needs comparable to those found in states. But it does not simply follow the same institutional structure as a state with its own elected governor and House of Assembly.

To understand any claim about authority in the FCT, we must examine the provisions specific to the Territory rather than assuming that the rules for Nasarawa, Lagos or Rivers automatically apply without modification.

9. If states already exist, can Nigerians create more?

The Constitution provides a demanding process in section 8 for the creation of a new state. It requires specified support among relevant federal, state and local representatives, approval through a referendum in the demanding area, support from the required number of state legislatures and final supermajority approval in the National Assembly.

This is much more than drawing a proposed boundary or announcing that a community deserves its own state.

And even if a constitutional process is satisfied, a responsible public debate should still ask: What problem is the new state intended to solve?

Will it strengthen minority representation? Improve access to administration? Reduce conflict? Increase public costs? Fragment an existing political or economic region? Create stronger institutions—or simply new positions for political elites?

There is no reason to presume that every state-creation demand is unjustified. There is equally no reason to presume that every demand is automatically a programme of development.

A federal arrangement should be judged partly by what it allows people to accomplish, not simply by how many names appear on its map.

10. The great question: more states or stronger states?

Here is a question that deserves deeper Nigerian reflection.

At different moments in our history, people have sought a new state because they felt marginalised within a larger region or state. Such concerns can be serious and legitimate. Smaller units may bring institutions closer, increase representation and give neglected areas a greater political voice.

But creating more governments also creates more executive offices, legislatures, administrative systems and recurring expenditure. A new capital does not automatically create a productive economy. A new governor does not automatically produce accountable government.

There is therefore a danger of treating political subdivision as a substitute for economic and institutional development.

The alternative is not necessarily to reject new states. It is to compare several possibilities honestly: a new state, stronger local councils, better representation within existing states, fairer distribution of infrastructure, enhanced state revenue capacity, or a reallocation of constitutional powers.

Sometimes the problem really is exclusion from an existing territorial arrangement. Sometimes it is corruption, poor planning or weak local administration. Sometimes it is inadequate constitutional authority. Often several problems interact.

A serious federalism debate must diagnose the problem before choosing the reform.

Federalism has two ambitions that must coexist: shared government for matters requiring collective action, and self-government for matters communities are constitutionally empowered to manage.

Too much concentration may silence local differences. Too little coordination may make common problems impossible to solve. The aim is not to abolish that tension, but to design institutions capable of managing it.

11. How to use federalism to understand an everyday complaint

Return to our original example: “The government has refused to repair this road.”

A better investigation follows a sequence.

First, identify the road. Where is it? What route does it serve? Is there an official classification or administrative record identifying the responsible road authority?

Second, identify the legal responsibilities. Which institution has power over construction, maintenance or the particular project? Are multiple agencies involved?

Third, trace the money. Was a project included in a budget? Was a contract awarded? Were funds released? What records can establish the answer?

Fourth, examine implementation. What work was done, when, by whom and to what standard? What evidence supports claims of completion or failure?

Fifth, identify accountability channels. Which agency, legislative committee, oversight body, court or lawful public process can address the problem?

The same reasoning can be adapted to a primary school, health centre, sanitation problem or electricity complaint. But there is no universal rule that assigns every road, hospital or school solely to one tier of government. The applicable legal framework and actual institutional arrangement matter.

This is what a useful civic instrument does: it converts a broad accusation into a question capable of investigation.

12. The question beneath the question

Why does Nigeria have 36 states?

The immediate answer is constitutional: section 3 recognises and names them.

The historical answer is more complicated: the present number emerged from successive territorial reorganisations, especially during military rule, responding to a mixture of representation, minority concerns, administration and political strategy.

The philosophical answer takes us deeper still.

Nigeria contains many communities, needs and political interests. Its federal structure is one attempt to reconcile common political existence with the possibility of differentiated self-government.

Whether that attempt succeeds cannot be measured merely by counting states. We must investigate what powers those states possess, what resources they control, how accountable their institutions are and how effectively they cooperate.

And we must resist a seductive mistake: believing that because the central government is powerful, every failure belongs to the centre—or because governors exist, every local problem belongs to them.

The purpose of learning federalism is not to decide in advance whom to blame. It is to become more accurate about who has the power to act, who has the duty to act and what evidence shows that the duty was performed.

That capacity is a form of civic intelligence.

The NaijaOS Thinking Exercise

Statement A: “Nigeria has 36 states, so it must be highly decentralised.”

Does the number of states tell us how legislative, fiscal and administrative powers are distributed?

Statement B: “The Federal Government is the federation.”

What is lost when the whole constitutional order is confused with one government within it?

Statement C: “If our community gets a new state, development will follow automatically.”

What assumptions about resources, institutions, leadership and economic viability does that claim make?

Statement D: “Our local council is part of the state, so it has no constitutionally protected standing of its own.”

How should sections 7 and 162, the Fourth Schedule and the Supreme Court's 2024 judgment inform the analysis?

Statement E: “Electricity and railways are entirely federal matters; states have no legislative role.”

What happens to this statement when we examine the constitutional alterations enacted in 2023?

A six-question instrument: Who is responsible?

1. Problem: What exactly has gone wrong, and where?

2. Authority: Which level of government or public institution possesses the relevant legal power?

3. Duty: What does the Constitution, law, regulation or binding arrangement require that institution to do?

4. Money: Which funds, allocations or budgets are relevant, and what can be verified?

5. Performance: What evidence shows what the institution actually did or failed to do?

6. Remedy: Which lawful channel can correct, review or challenge the decision?

This instrument can become an interactive NaijaOS tool: Who Has the Power?

What we have learned

Federation: The constitutional political order combining common government with constituent territorial governments.

Federal Government: The central government exercising the powers assigned to federal institutions; it is not identical to the entire federation.

Federalism: A principle of constitutionally distributed authority, not simply a count of states.

Exclusive, concurrent and residual powers: Different categories used to understand which legislatures may act on particular subjects, always subject to the exact constitutional provisions.

Fiscal federalism: The allocation, generation and use of public revenues across levels of government.

Local-government autonomy: A question of constitutional position, democratic governance, finances and real-world implementation—not merely a slogan.

Next in The Grammar of Nigeria

Essay 004: If Nigeria Is a Republic, Why Does Democracy Matter?

What makes a country a republic? What makes it democratic? Can a republic fail to be democratic? And why do elections alone not answer every question about how power should be exercised?

The Grammar of Nigeria is a NaijaOS civic reasoning series. It supplies readers with concepts, evidence and questions for understanding Nigeria—not predetermined political conclusions.

Primary references and further reading

• Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), sections 2–4, 7–9, 162 and 299; First, Second and Fourth Schedules Source

• Senate Committee on Constitution Review, constitutional provisions on the Federation and its states Source

• National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, Political Economy of State Creation in Nigeria Source

• Federal Ministry of Information, 2023 constitutional alterations concerning electricity, railways and other matters Source

• Federal Ministry of Information, Supreme Court local-government autonomy judgment implementation committee (20 August 2024) Source

• Worugji and Worugji, The Supreme Court Affirmation of the Status and Autonomy of Local Governments under the 1999 Nigerian Constitution, Journal of African Law (2026) Source